China may feel that America’s new isolationism has handed it a fleeting chance to resolve its “Taiwan problem” on its own terms.

Donald Trump’s return to the White House has upended calculations across the Pacific. Although outwardly committed to oppose the rise of China, America’s 47th president began his second term in January 2025 much as he ended his first: by questioning U.S. security commitments abroad and extolling an “America First” agenda which is focused more on restricting China's economic impact, than its military.  In Beijing, meanwhile, Xi Jinping has reinforced his directive that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) be ready by 2027 to seize Taiwan by force if necessary defensenews.com.  

The confluence of these two trends is hardly comforting for Taiwan. Mr. Trump’s isolationist bent – and Xi’s military timeline – together create what Chinese strategists might see as an ideal window from now through 2028 to attempt reunification by force. It is a convergence of circumstance and ambition: the next few years may offer Beijing its best shot at subduing Taiwan while an isolationist America decides Taiwan 'is not our fight'. airuniversity.af.eduairuniversity.af.edu.

Several factors make this moment enticing for China’s leaders. First is the shifting military balance in the Western Pacific. After two decades of breakneck expansion, the PLA Navy is now the world’s largest by number of ships and still growing, on track for 395 warships by 2025 and 435 by 2030 cfr.org. China can mass forces near its shores, whereas the U.S. Navy must steam from distant bases and contend with Beijing’s formidable anti-access weaponry. The PLA Rocket Force now fields hundreds of advanced missiles – including “carrier-killer” ballistic missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles – that threaten U.S. carrier strike groups and regional bases. Indeed, the Pentagon assesses that China has “the world’s leading hypersonic missile arsenal” cfr.org. Its modernized H-6K and H-6J bombers can launch long-range cruise missiles capable of striking U.S. ships and bases as far as Guam cfr.org. In plain language, China’s firepower in the Taiwan theater is daunting. American forces, by contrast, would be stretched and constrained. The U.S. defense establishment has only belatedly begun investing in Pacific deterrence, and its shipbuilding and munitions production have struggled to keep pace cfr.org. In any Taiwan conflict fought in Asia’s waters and skies, the PLA’s local advantages in sheer platforms and missiles could neuter America’s ability to respond – especially under a president who decides - as he said repeatedly about Ukraine - this is not America's fight.

That reluctance is the second factor. Mr. Trump’s well-known skepticism of U.S. alliance commitments has only deepened as the year has progressed. During his campaign and early in this term, he pointedly questioned the value of defending Taiwan, suggesting the island should pay more for American protection theguardian.com. Mr. Trump has pointedly reverted to 'strategic ambiguity' on Taiwan. Asked whether he would prevent a forcible Chinese takeover, he demurred: “I never comment on that. I don’t want to ever put myself in that position,” he said, to the alarm of Taipei policycircle.org. Such reticence, combined with his transactional view of alliances, has raised fears that Taiwan could be treated as a bargaining chip in a “grand deal” with Beijing policycircle.org. Washington has reportedly pressed Taipei to radically boost its defence spending – up to 10% of GDP, an impossible ask – while hinting that U.S. help might depend on Taiwan’s “payments” for its security theguardian.com. Beijing may well soon gamble that an isolationist America would blanch at a war with China over an island 7,000 miles from California – especially if Mr. Trump sees little political or economic benefit in rescuing Taipei.

China's smaller air force now includes several hundred J-20 and J-36 stealth fighters, is mostly based on the coast facing Taiwan, and dwarfs what the US could quickly deploy to the Pacific in the case of an invasion.

A third element in Beijing’s calculus is time – specifically, the narrow window before new American military technology tips the scales. The late 2020s will see the fruition of several major U.S. modernization programs, but most are not battle-ready yet. The Air Force’s next-generation B-21 Raider stealth bombers will only reach initial service around 2027 en.wikipedia.org. The Navy’s Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines, its costliest new vessels, won’t begin patrols until the 2030s en.wikipedia.org. A new sixth-generation jet fighter is likewise not expected until the 2030s en.wikipedia.org. And while the Pentagon scrambles to field hypersonic missiles of its own, those programs have suffered delays and won’t yield deployable weapons for a few years at least asiatimes.comasiatimes.com. In short, America’s military edge is poised to sharpen – but not until after 2028. 

By contrast China has caught up in terms of naval vessel quality, is launching its third aircraft carrier this year, has formidable new stealth aircraft in mass production and a sixth generation prototype already flying, and according to the Pentagon's own assessments, is leading the US in deployment of hypersonic missiles and cyber warfare capabilities.

If China strikes now, it would face an American arsenal missing many of these nascent capabilities. Every year that passes, however, promises to bring six generation fighters designed for war in the Pacific, new long-range missiles, and other reinforcements that improve Washington’s hand. Xi Jinping is surely aware that waiting only gives his rival time to get stronger. Seizing the moment before those odds worsen has a cold logic to it.

On the island itself, trends also favor Beijing’s “sooner rather than later” mindset. Taiwan’s current government remains stubbornly anti-unification. President Lai Ching-te (successor to Tsai Ing-wen) has openly declared China a “foreign hostile force” and overseen unprecedented civil defense drills to gird Taiwanese society for a possible attackcfr.org. He continues to court U.S. support, deepening ties that infuriate Beijing. From China’s perspective, Taipei is slipping further from its grasp under the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which shows no interest in negotiating a Hong Kong-style “one country, two systems” deal. Beijing faces a democratic timetable not of its choosing: Taiwan’s electorate will vote again in 2028, but waiting for a more pro-China opposition to take power is a risky gamble at best. For now, the island is led by a party Beijing deems resolutely separatist, and that party has bolstered its informal alliance with Washington. Chinese officials warn that Taiwan’s deepening military cooperation with America (in the form of arms sales and training missions) is a provocation – one that might justify “reunification by force.” If Xi sees Taiwan only drifting further out of the fold, he has less incentive to postpone what he views as an inevitable historical mission.

China’s own trajectory offers another incentive to act sooner. Today China stands near the height of its national power, with the world’s second-largest economy and decades of investment yielding a modern fighting force. But storm clouds gather on the long-term horizon. Economic growth is slowing, squeezed by debt and an aging population. In fact, China’s population has already peaked and begun to decline, and its working-age cohort will shrink by over 7% from 2025 to 2050 thediplomat.comthediplomat.com. The dividend of endless cheap labor – the engine of China’s rise – is disappearing thediplomat.com. Xi’s tighter authoritarian grip and crackdowns on the tech sector have chilled private investment, further dimming growth prospects thediplomat.com. Meanwhile, U.S.-led export controls on critical technologies promise to bite harder over time thediplomat.com. In short, Beijing faces a “use it or lose it” moment in terms of relative power. Its military might is formidable now, backed by an economy still strong enough to weather the shocks of war. But fast-forward a decade: a poorer, greyer China might be less confident in a prolonged conflict, while a re-armed America (and perhaps a less Trumpian one) could present a stiffer challenge. Some analysts even suggest Xi Jinping, who is in his 70s, views the late 2020s as his best chance to cement a legacy of national rejuvenation via Taiwan airuniversity.af.eduairuniversity.af.edu. Striking while the iron is hot – before it cools appreciably – has strategic appeal. Waiting, by contrast, carries the risk that China’s power could plateau or even wane, a prospect that must haunt a leadership obsessed with national resurgence.

A west weary of other people's wars

Would the world sit by if China lunged at Taiwan in the next few years? Here, too, Xi might find the landscape to his liking. Key U.S. allies in Asia are uneasy and in flux under wavering US leadership. Japan, arguably the linchpin of America’s Indo-Pacific strategy, has been scrambling to rearm. It is boosting defense outlays to record levels – nearly ¥10 trillion ($70 billion) by 2026, about 1.8% of GDP, with plans for missiles that can strike enemy launch sitestheguardian.comtheguardian.com. But Tokyo’s confidence in American resolve has been shaken. US grumbling that the U.S.–Japan security treaty is “one-sided” – because it obliges America to defend Japan, but not vice-versa – is hardly forgotten theguardian.com. During his first term the US President even floated the idea of withdrawing U.S. troops from Japan and South Korea unless they paid far more. Japan’s leaders know a Taiwan conflict could quickly threaten Japanese territory (“If Taiwan falls, the Senkakus are next,” warned a former Japanese deputy prime minister). Yet they also know Japan cannot tackle China alone. If Washington wavers, Japan faces an existential dilemma. It might support Taiwan if the US commits – or it might demur if America itself appears half-hearted. From Beijing’s viewpoint, the current cloud over the U.S.-Japan alliance is a strategic boon: it sows just enough doubt to make coordination in a crisis less assured.

Other regional players would hardly rush to Taiwan’s defense. Across Southeast Asia, governments have long mastered the art of hedging between great powers, and a superpower conflict on their doorstep would put them in an uncomfortable bind. With the U.S. less predictably engaged, their inclination may be to quietly accommodate the rising hegemon next door. Even stalwart American partners like the Philippines, which hosts U.S. forces, might hesitate if they sense Washington itself is reluctant. Many ASEAN countries would likely issue tepid calls for peaceful dialogue while studiously avoiding siding with Washington. Indeed, Beijing has been busy wooing its neighbors economically to capitalize on doubts about America’s commitment. As Mr. Trump slapped tariffs even on U.S. allies, China moved to bolster trade ties with those same countries, easing restrictions on Japanese goods and pursuing border accords with India theguardian.comtheguardian.com. Such gestures make it harder for wavering regional states to unite against China. In the end, most of Asia would stay on the sidelines, hoping to dodge the fallout. They need no reminder that Taiwan’s plight – while tragic – is not worth inviting Chinese ire upon themselves.

Europe to the rescue? Yeah, no.

And what of the broader international reaction? European leaders, already preoccupied with their own security crisis in Ukraine, may see a Taiwan war as beyond their remit if the U.S. president isn’t leading a united response. They would condemn Chinese aggression, certainly, and perhaps coordinate sanctions. But any economic punishment would be toothless without full U.S. backing – and Mr. Trump’s commitment to a sanctions regime against Beijing is far from guaranteed as the US 'sanctions lite' response to Russia has shown. Indeed, Chinese diplomats detect an opportunity. One of Beijing’s envoys to the EU was reportedly gleeful that the US approach to Europe was making EU leaders more receptive to China’s calls for “peaceful cooperation” theguardian.com. It is a classic divide-and-conquer tactic, and for now it seems to be working. Europe’s major powers show little appetite for confrontation with China, especially if Washington is unreliable. In practical terms, that means Xi would not fear that European militaries will ride to Taiwan’s rescue. At most, Europe might offer moral support and humanitarian aid, then seek to mediate once the dust settles. A swift Chinese fait accompli in Taipei could well be met with a resigned shrug in capitals from Paris to Berlin, however much politicians would lament the breach of international norms. The uncomfortable truth is that, absent strong U.S. leadership, the Western world is unlikely to muster a muscular response.

None of this is to say that an invasion of Taiwan in the 2025–28 window would be easy or low-risk for China. Taiwan’s armed forces, though outmatched, would fight ferociously to defend their democracy. Failing a swift victory, a drawn out cross-strait war could wreck China’s economy and carry incalculable geopolitical danger. Yet from Beijing’s perspective, the strategic stars may never align quite so favorably again. US isolationism, its temporary military capability gap, Taiwan’s defiant politics, and China’s current strength form a tantalizing constellation. Xi Jinping has publicly ordered his generals to be ready by 2027 – and they have obediently built the tools for the job defensenews.com theguardian.com. 

The final calculation, of course, will be Xi’s alone. But if ever there was a moment when the plucky island’s fate might be decided by force, this is it. In Beijing’s eyes, history has handed them a rare chance to right what they consider a historic wrong. The world holds its breath, hoping cooler heads prevail – even as the window for war, stands ominously ajar.

(AI disclosure: research for this article was assisted by ChatGPT.)