World War H is the next novel from FX Holden but what is Hybrid Warfare exactly? And what is a country like the US doing to combat it? Here is your DEEP dive into the topic! Grab a coffee (tea, wine, bourbon) and dig in.

Introduction: The Hybrid Warfare Threat

Hybrid warfare – sometimes called gray-zone conflict or low-intensity warfare – involves achieving strategic aims through non-traditional means without overt large-scale military forcedefense.gov. Adversaries blend propaganda, deception, economic pressure, sabotage, and other indirect tactics to destabilize target nations. For example, Russia’s use of disinformation, proxy militias, and covert action in Ukraine and China’s use of civilian fishing militias in the South China Sea are seen as textbook hybrid methodsnavy.milcimsec.org. As Army Lt. Gen. Karen Gibson noted, this approach allows foes to challenge the U.S. “without fighting” in a conventional sense, exploiting the “unprecedented ability to use information as an element of warfare” in today’s connected worlddefense.govdefense.gov. The United States recognizes that such tactics – which date back to Sun Tzu’s dictum that “the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting” – present a critical challenge to national securitydefense.govnavy.mil. 

Let's look at the challenges posed by Hybrid Warfare, but exclude cyber warfare, which is much better recognized.

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A Dispersed but Growing Response

No single unified “Hybrid Warfare Command” exists in the U.S. defense establishment dedicated solely to hybrid or irregular threats. Instead, responsibility for countering hybrid warfare is distributed across multiple military branches and agencies. In fact, senior officials acknowledge the Pentagon has used “a number of synonyms” – irregular, unconventional, asymmetric, hybrid, gray-zone – reflecting some ambiguity in roles and doctrinedefense.gov. Historically, U.S. strategy prioritized conventional warfighting, and irregular warfare was treated as a lesser included mission (an annex to the 2018 National Defense Strategy)defense.govdefense.gov. However, recent years have seen a concerted effort to better coordinate and elevate U.S. capabilities for the hybrid threat. Irregular warfare is now integrated into top-level defense strategy as “a key part of integrated deterrence” alongside traditional combat powerdefense.gov.

One major step was Congress authorizing an Irregular Warfare Functional Center (IWFC) in 2021, intended to “enhance and sustain focus on” nontraditional warfare and educate officers in countering these threatsrand.org. The Department of Defense stood up a new Irregular Warfare Center (IWC) in 2022, which reached initial operating capacity by October 2022. The IWC is explicitly described as the “central mechanism for developing the Department of Defense’s irregular warfare knowledge” and advancing understanding of hybrid/irregular concepts across the forceirregularwarfarecenter.org. This reflects a shift toward a more coordinated, whole-of-DoD approach – but execution still spans many organizations. What follows is a look at how various U.S. military branches and security agencies specialize in aspects of hybrid warfare, from information operations to counter-sabotage (excluding purely cyber warfare, which is handled by dedicated cyber commands not covered here).

"In summary, the U.S. response to hybrid warfare remains scattered and uncoordinated - distributed across multiple commands and agencies, each attacking a piece of the problem" 

U.S. Army: Special Operations and Influence Warfare

Within the Army, the primary focus for hybrid threats lies in its special operations and information forces. The U.S. Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF), which include Green Berets (Special Forces), Army Psychological Operations units, and Civil Affairs, provide unique capabilities to counter irregular and hybrid threats worldwidendupress.ndu.edundupress.ndu.edu. Army Special Forces are trained in unconventional warfare – for instance, raising and advising local militias or resistance movements – and in Foreign Internal Defense to shore up partners, which directly counters adversaries’ efforts to foment insurgency or instabilityndupress.ndu.edundupress.ndu.edu. Army Psychological Operations (PSYOP) soldiers (renamed Military Information Support Operations) plan and execute influence campaigns to counter enemy propaganda, sway local populations, and support U.S. strategic communications. These PSYOP units (for example, the 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne) under U.S. Army Special Operations Command) specialize in information warfare and deception operations that are vital against hybrid tacticsndupress.ndu.edundupress.ndu.edu.

To adapt to evolving threats, the Army has also created new structures for information warfare. For two decades, the Army’s 1st Information Operations Command (Land) was the only active-duty unit dedicated to information operations, deploying teams globally to help Army and joint commanders gain an “information advantage”army.milarmy.mil. In May 2025, 1st IO Command was inactivated as the Army reorganized these functions under U.S. Army Cyber Command – carrying its legacy forward through “Information Advantage” forces and Theater Information Advantage Detachments that will integrate information warfare into multi-domain operationsarmy.milarmy.mil. The Army is thus embedding hybrid warfare countermeasures (like influence, deception, and information protection) into its broader cyber and electronic warfare framework.

Notably, the Army also fielded the Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) from 2006–2021 as a special unit to study enemy irregular tactics and rapidly devise countermeasures. AWG operatives in Iraq and Afghanistan analyzed insurgent methods – from IED techniques to information campaigns – and advised Army units on adaptive tactics. As the Army shifted focus to great-power competition, it decided to discontinue the AWG in 2021, believing its functions could be absorbed by the broader forcearmy.milarmy.mil. To preserve institutional knowledge, the AWG’s lessons learned in countering hybrid/adaptive threats were handed off to the Center for Army Lessons Learned and other schoolsarmy.mil. While AWG no longer exists, its mission indicates how seriously the Army regarded the need to “think like the enemy” in hybrid conflicts. Today, Army training centers also use hybrid threat scenarios – blending conventional forces with guerrillas, terrorists, and criminal proxies – to prepare units for the full spectrum of conflictarmyupress.army.milarmyupress.army.mil.

U.S. Marine Corps: Information Maneuver and Influence

The Marine Corps, traditionally a purely expeditionary combat force, has in recent years stood up dedicated capabilities to contend with information and hybrid warfare. In 2017 the Marines created their first Marine Expeditionary Force Information Group (MIG) – a unit “solely focused on the confluence of information and cyber warfare” within a Marine Corps division-equivalent commandmarinecorpstimes.com. The MIGs combine specialties like signals intelligence, electronic warfare, operational security, and military deception to support Marine forces in contested information environments. However, initially the Marines lacked their own psychological operations branch and had to borrow or coordinate with Army PSYOP for influence missionscgsc.contentdm.oclc.org. To fix this, the Marine Corps launched a new 17XX “Information Maneuver” occupational field in 2022, which for the first time creates Marine PSYOP and influence officers as a permanent career fieldmarinecorpstimes.commarinecorpstimes.com.

Under this reform, Marines in ranks up to lieutenant colonel can become “Influence Officers,” and enlisted Marines can become Psychological Operations specialists (Influence Specialists) and Civil Affairs Specialists focused on the information fightmarinecorpstimes.commarinecorpstimes.com. Marines holding legacy PSYOP or Civil Affairs MOSs have been transitioned into the new field, reflecting the Corps’ view that “fights over misinformation and propaganda” are inseparable from modern combatmarinecorpstimes.commarinecorpstimes.com. These specialists, working within the MIG and across Marine forces, enable the Corps to conduct influence campaigns, counter adversary narratives, and coordinate information operations alongside its kinetic operations. The Marine Corps has essentially acknowledged that winning the “battle of the story” is as critical as winning the battle on the ground. As Lt. Gen. Matthew Glavy (Deputy Commandant for Information) put it, this professionalization ensures Marines can “continue doing what they are passionate about” in the information domain while improving the Corps’ readiness for hybrid threatsmarinecorpstimes.com.

U.S. Navy: Information Warfare and Hybrid Threat Research

The U.S. Navy addresses hybrid warfare primarily through its Information Warfare Community and specialized research efforts. The Navy has formally established an Information Warfare (IW) corps that integrates intelligence, electronic warfare, cyber operations, oceanographic/weather units, and communications networks – all aimed at achieving decision advantage and disrupting adversaries short of open war16af.af.mil. Each Navy fleet now includes an Information Warfare Commander, and unique task forces have stood up solely focused on these missions. For example, the U.S. Pacific Fleet created a Fleet Information Warfare Command Pacific to synchronize information operations in that theateren.wikipedia.org. Navy Information Operations Commands (NIOC), under U.S. Tenth Fleet (Fleet Cyber Command), are key operational units. A case in point is NIOC Pacific, with over 2,000 sailors and civilians, which provides extensive IW support (signals intelligence, electronic warfare, OPSEC, etc.) to the Pacific Fleet and U.S. Indo-Pacific Commandnavifor.usff.navy.mil. NIOC Pacific is described as “a leader in integrating information warfare efforts across cyber, space, and electromagnetic domains”, directly supporting the Navy’s ability to counter hybrid tactics at seanavifor.usff.navy.mil. In practice, this means Navy IW units help protect military networks from intrusion, jam or deceive adversary sensors, conduct military deception (e.g. using decoys or false signals), and track adversary influence operations – all of which are tools to negate an enemy’s hybrid playbook.

The Navy is also investing in education and research on hybrid threats. In 2021, the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) launched a Center on Combating Hybrid Threats (CCHT) as an academic hub to study and counter emerging hybrid-warfare techniquesnavy.mil. This center brings together experts across disciplines to develop strategies to “detect, deny, disrupt, degrade, defeat and ultimately deter” hybrid tactics by adversariesnavy.mil. NPS’s CCHT works with partners like the Department of Energy’s national labs and NATO’s Hybrid Threat Centre of Excellence in Finland, focusing on scenarios such as protecting critical infrastructure from sabotage or countering disinformation campaignsnavy.milnavy.mil. The Navy’s academic and war-college publications (for instance, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings articles) increasingly discuss operations in the “information environment”, reflecting an ongoing doctrinal effort to incorporate hybrid warfare lessons (sometimes termed “cognitive warfare”) into naval strategyusni.orgcimsec.org. Additionally, Naval Special Warfare units (SEALs) contribute to hybrid conflict capabilities by conducting maritime unconventional warfare – such as sabotage raids, special reconnaissance, or training foreign maritime forces – which can be decisive against hybrid threats like covert maritime militias or terrorist networks at sea.

U.S. Air Force: Information Dominance and Influence Operations

The Air Force has reorganized dramatically in order to confront information-age and hybrid threats. In 2019, the Air Force combined its cyber warfare, intelligence, surveillance/reconnaissance, and electronic warfare forces under a single unified command: the Sixteenth Air Force (Air Forces Cyber), which serves as the Air Force’s dedicated Information Warfare Numbered Air Force16af.af.miljbsa.mil. Headquartered in Texas, the 16th AF’s mission is to “focus on information warfare in the modern age” by integrating a wide array of capabilities – ISR, cyber operations, electronic warfare, weather, public affairs, and information operations – to achieve effects against adversaries across the cyber and information domain16af.af.mil. In simple terms, this command can fuse intelligence insights with offensive cyber and electronic measures and messaging campaigns to shape an adversary’s decisions without firing a shot. The 16th AF explicitly defines Information Warfare as “the employment of military capabilities in and through the information environment to deliberately affect adversary human and system behavior”16af.af.mil. Notably, public affairs (i.e., the messaging and narrative side) is listed alongside technical disciplines – an acknowledgement that controlling the narrative and countering disinformation is part of the Air Force’s warfighting toolkit. This organizational reform means the Air Force’s planning staffs and operational units now treat cyberspace operations, electronic jamming, psychological operations, and traditional kinetic missions as part of one continuum in conflict short of declared war16af.af.mil16af.af.mil. It ensures that, for example, an Air Force cyber team might takedown an adversary propaganda server at the same time that an electronic warfare aircraft blocks their radars and an information operations team prepares truthful counter-messaging – all coordinated under one command for maximum effect.

Air Force Special Operations also contributes to counter–hybrid warfare, albeit often in partnership with other services. For instance, the Air Force’s 193rd Special Operations Wing (Pennsylvania Air National Guard) operates EC-130J “Commando Solo” aircraft outfitted to broadcast radio and TV messages over broad areas – a unique strategic psychological operations platform used in conflicts like Afghanistan and Iraq to counter enemy propaganda and communicate with civilian populations. (During the Gulf War and operations in Haiti and Bosnia, earlier versions of these aircraft famously broadcast messages urging enemy troops to surrender or populations to stay calm.) This capability allows the U.S. to project influence from the air, supporting the information campaign integral to hybrid warfare. In addition, Air Force legal and intelligence personnel are examining how adversaries exploit “lawfare” and legal messaging as part of hybrid conflict. A recent Air Force JAG paper noted that Russia and others **“weaponize” legal frameworks and propaganda – for example, falsely invoking international law to justify aggression – and emphasized the need for operational legal advisors to help counter such tactics in the gray zonejagreporter.af.miljagreporter.af.mil. This illustrates that every domain, from cyberspace to the courtroom of public opinion, is being treated as a battleground. The Air Force’s response to hybrid threats, therefore, ranges from technological measures (cyber defense, electronic attack) to information and influence efforts aimed at undermining hostile narratives and bolstering U.S. messaging.

U.S. Space Force: Safeguarding the Space Domain Against Hybrid Tactics

As the newest branch, the U.S. Space Force is tasked with securing U.S. interests in space – a realm where hybrid warfare tactics are increasingly evident. Adversaries have developed non-kinetic means (below the threshold of overt war) to interfere with satellites and space-based services that the U.S. military and society rely on. In response, the Space Force has units specifically focusing on identifying and countering these subtle space threats. For example, the Space Force’s 527th Space Aggressor Squadron (527 SAS) plays the role of the “enemy” in exercises by simulating emerging space hybrid tacticsspaceforce.mil. Their mission is to “know, teach, and replicate modern, emerging, and integrated space threats” such as GPS jamming, communications interference, and orbital harassment, in order to train U.S. and allied forces to operate in a “contested, degraded, and operationally-limited” environmentspaceforce.mil. In training scenarios, the 527 SAS might employ a GPS electromagnetic attack system to jam navigation signals or mimic a hostile actor trying to dazzle a satellite’s sensorsspaceforce.mil. This prepares U.S. commanders to recognize and overcome space-based harassment that an opponent could use in a hybrid campaign (for instance, disruptive jamming that cannot immediately be attributed as an act of war).

Operationally, the Space Force is fortifying the resilience of U.S. space infrastructure against ambiguous aggression. This includes hardening satellites against laser dazzling or cyber intrusion, building redundant communications paths, and developing tactics to rapidly attribute and respond to interference. If, say, a foreign power covertly jams U.S. GPS signals over a region (a scenario analysts indeed label hybrid warfare in spaceairandspaceforces.comlieber.westpoint.edu), Space Force units in Space Operations Command would work with U.S. Intelligence Community sensors to attribute the source, while Space Force electronic warfare units (like those operating the new Meadowland satellite jamming countermeasures) might deploy to counter-jam or isolate the hostile signaldefensescoop.comairandspaceforces.com. The Space Force is also responsible for “Space Domain Awareness” – tracking objects and activities in orbit – which helps detect suspicious behavior such as a foreign satellite shadowing a U.S. asset (potentially to interfere or spy on it). By closely monitoring for these grey-zone actions in space and being ready to intervene (e.g. via diplomatic warning or technological countermeasure), the Space Force serves as a frontline defender against hybrid attacks targeting U.S. critical space systems. In sum, while the Space Force may not have a unit named “hybrid warfare division,” its core mission of protecting satellites and signals inherently involves countering the non-traditional, ambiguous attacks that characterize hybrid operations in the space domain.

U.S. Coast Guard: Securing the Maritime Front

Though part of the Department of Homeland Security in peacetime, the U.S. Coast Guard is one of the nation’s armed services and plays a crucial role in guarding against hybrid threats on the maritime front, especially from foreign actors. The Coast Guard’s daily missions – port security, coastal patrol, law enforcement, and search-and-rescue – increasingly intersect with the kind of covert or deniable aggression seen in hybrid warfare. For example, Coast Guard units monitor and board commercial vessels to prevent sabotage or covert hostile activity in U.S. ports. This became a focus after intelligence indicated that adversaries could target undersea cables, port facilities, or shipping chokepoints in a conflictcimsec.org. Hybrid tactics in the maritime domain might include using unmarked “little green men” boats or state-backed fishing fleets to intrude on territorial waters, mining harbors clandestinely, or disguising military units as civilian shipping. The Coast Guard, with its unique law enforcement authority and military capability, is the first line of defense against such gray-zone incursions in U.S. waterscimsec.orgcimsec.org.

Inside U.S. ports, the Coast Guard’s Captains of the Port and Maritime Safety & Security Teams enforce regulations that require reporting of any “evidence of sabotage or subversive activity” at facilitiesbytebacklaw.com. This regulatory power is a tool to harden critical maritime infrastructure against insider threats or tampering – a hybrid threat concern. Externally, the Coast Guard’s Intelligence Coordination Center and Coast Guard Investigative Service work with the Navy and FBI to track foreign espionage or illicit maritime operations (such as weapons smuggling or sanctions evasion) that could be part of an adversary’s asymmetric campaign. Coast Guard cutters deployed abroad (in the Western Pacific or Persian Gulf, for instance) also engage in maritime security cooperation, training partner nations’ coast guards to recognize and counter hybrid tactics like illegal militia fishing fleets or disguised merchant vessels. A telling example is how some NATO and partner countries have expanded Coast Guard rules of engagement to confront aggressive foreign “fishing” vessels or maritime militia – Finland, for instance, authorized its coast guard to use deadly force in 2017 due to hybrid threat concernscimsec.org. The U.S. Coast Guard similarly stands ready to back up U.S. Navy or allied fleets in scenarios short of war.

In essence, the Coast Guard bridges the gap between civilian security and military defense in the maritime domain. It tackles the “soft” threats – illegal trafficking, port disruptions, covert interference with shipping – that, if orchestrated by an enemy state or proxy, form a component of hybrid warfare. By maintaining robust domain awareness (monitoring who and what is in U.S. waters), conducting vessel boardings and inspections, and having forces poised to respond to maritime incidents, the Coast Guard adds a vital, coordinated layer to U.S. defenses against foreign hybrid attacks.

Interagency and Intelligence Efforts (Foreign Influence Focus)

Because hybrid warfare often blurs the line between military and civilian targets, U.S. security agencies beyond the DoD also play a major role, particularly in countering foreign influence and information warfare on U.S. soil. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) leads domestic counterintelligence against malign foreign influence operations. In 2017, the FBI established a dedicated Foreign Influence Task Force (FITF) to “identify and counteract” covert or coercive foreign efforts aimed at U.S. democratic institutions and discoursefbi.gov. The FITF brings together agents and analysts from the FBI’s counterintelligence, cyber, criminal, and counterterrorism divisions under one umbrella focused on foreign disinformation, propaganda, and election interferencefbi.gov. Its goal is to detect and disrupt activities like false social media personas sowing discord, influence-for-hire campaigns, or illicit funding of political groupsfbi.govfbi.gov. The task force coordinates investigations across all 56 FBI field offices and works closely with social media companies to share threat indicators, resulting in the removal of hundreds of fake accounts linked to hostile actorsfbi.govfbi.gov. During the 2018 and 2020 elections, the FBI FITF and its partners thwarted or exposed multiple foreign influence plots – for example, indicting a Russian operative in 2018 for running an online troll farm that spent millions to undermine U.S. politicsfbi.gov. The FBI also works hand-in-hand with the Department of Homeland Security and state election officials to harden election infrastructure and communications against both cyber attacks and information manipulationfbi.gov. In short, the FBI provides the investigative muscle to attribute and penalize foreign hybrid actions on U.S. soil, from propaganda campaigns to sabotage or espionage.

On the diplomatic and strategic communications front, the U.S. Department of State had, until recently, a dedicated center to counter foreign disinformation. The Global Engagement Center (GEC) was created in 2016 with the mission to “direct, lead, synchronize, and coordinate” the U.S. government’s efforts to expose and counter foreign propaganda and disinformation aimed at America and its alliesen.wikipedia.org. Initially born to combat terrorist group propaganda (like ISIS’s online messaging), the GEC’s authority was soon expanded by Congress to include state actors such as Russia, China, and Iran – especially after Russian interference in the 2016 election became evidenten.wikipedia.org. The GEC, operating with an interagency staff and funding for technology tools, produced analyses of adversary disinformation ecosystems (for example, publishing a detailed report on “Russia’s Pillars of Disinformation and Propaganda” in 2020) and funded programs to support independent media and digital literacy abroad2021-2025.state.gov. It also shared information with platforms and foreign partners to help dismantle fake news networks. By mandate, the GEC focused on foreign propaganda (to avoid infringing on domestic speech) and worked closely with intelligence agencies to track malign influence campaignsen.wikipedia.orgen.wikipedia.org. (NB: As of late 2024, the GEC was defunded and its functions reorganized, amid policy debates, into a smaller State Department officeen.wikipedia.orgen.wikipedia.org. This underscores the continued contention over how best to structure U.S. counter-disinformation efforts.) Even so, the core GEC mission – countering foreign lies with truth and organizing a whole-of-government response – remains an important part of U.S. strategy against hybrid warfare. Indeed, in 2022 the Office of the Director of National Intelligence set up a Foreign Malign Influence Center (FMIC) to bolster analysis of foreign influence threats and support agencies like GECen.wikipedia.org.

Finally, the U.S. Intelligence Community at large (NSA, CIA, DHS’s intelligence office, etc.) underpins all these efforts by collecting information on adversaries’ hybrid plans. For instance, NSA and U.S. Cyber Command monitor foreign cyber units that might be sowing misinformation or targeting infrastructure (even though pure cyber attacks are outside this discussion, the intel gained often illuminates broader hybrid campaigns). The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and service intelligence branches track indicators of hybrid operations – such as the movement of proxy forces, influence of front organizations, or financial flows that could fund subversive activitiescimsec.orgcimsec.org. When Army Gen. Paul Nakasone (head of NSA/Cyber Command) speaks of “defending forward” in cyberspace, it often entails preempting foreign information operations before they hit the homeland. Likewise, U.S. Northern Command and DHS share intelligence to guard against covert foreign sabotage of critical infrastructure (a classic hybrid tactic). The important point is that interagency coordination has improved: the FBI, DHS, CIA, NSA, State, and DoD regularly sit together in task forces (for example, the Foreign Influence Task Force includes DHS and ODNI liaisons) to share a “common operating picture” of hybrid threats and decide on responsesfbi.govfbi.gov. This whole-of-government approach is essential because hybrid warfare exploits any seams between military, law enforcement, and civil domains.

Conclusion: Toward a Unified Front Against Hybrid Warfare

In summary, the U.S. response to hybrid warfare remains scattered and uncoordinated distributed across multiple commands and agencies, each attacking a piece of the problem – but there is growing recognition of the need to unify these efforts. The Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, Space Force, and Coast Guard have all developed specialized units or doctrines to address facets of hybrid conflict, from psychological operations and civil-military engagement on the ground to information warfare in the cyber and space domains, and from counter-sabotage security in ports to influence operations in the airwaves. These military capabilities are complemented by civilian security agencies like the FBI (shielding the homeland from foreign subversion) and State Department (leading the narrative fight against foreign propaganda) in concert with the intelligence community. While there is no single “Hybrid Warfare Department” in the Pentagon, the establishment of coordination hubs like the DoD’s Irregular Warfare Centerirregularwarfarecenter.org and ODNI’s FMIC suggests a drive toward greater integration. U.S. officials often emphasize a “whole-of-government” and even “whole-of-society” approach is needed to counter hybrid threatscimsec.orgcimsec.org, since adversaries will target vulnerabilities across military and civilian spheres.

Crucially, the U.S. and its allies are learning to anticipate hybrid tactics and build resilience rather than react piecemeal. Exercises and war games now include robust hybrid threat scenarios; for example, NATO and U.S. forces simulate coordinated cyber, information, and proxy attacks to practice interagency response. NATO has even developed a “Counter Hybrid Strategy,” and the U.S., as a leading member, aligns with those effortsndupress.ndu.edu. Still, challenges remain in ensuring all the moving parts – across five armed services and many agencies – act in sync. A defense intelligence official frankly observed that “the myriad of names” we use (irregular, hybrid, gray-zone, etc.) is a sign we are still refining our approachdefense.gov. But the trend is clear: **hybrid warfare defense is increasingly institutionalized within the U.S. national security architecture, not left to ad hoc efforts. The United States is bolstering its organizational muscle memory to quickly recognize hybrid aggression – be it a barrage of fake social media narratives or suspicious “fishermen” mapping undersea cables – and to respond in a coordinated, multi-faceted manner that blunts the attack without necessarily escalating to full military conflict. In the long run, this proactive and coordinated posture, spread across dedicated elements in each service and agency, aims to deter adversaries from ever launching hybrid attacks against the United States by denying them the easy wins they seek in the shadowsnavy.mildefense.gov.

Sources: U.S. Department of Defense and military service publications; Congressional and RAND analyses; FBI and State Department releases on foreign influence; Naval Postgraduate School and NATO Center of Excellence research on hybrid warfare

defense.govdefense.govnavy.milirregularwarfarecenter.orgndupress.ndu.eduarmy.milmarinecorpstimes.comnavifor.usff.navy.mil16af.af.milspaceforce.milcimsec.orgfbi.goven.wikipedia.org.